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I. INTRODUCTION
Several infant adoption cases captured media attention in the 1990s
when unwed biological fathers gained custody of children previously
placed with adoptive families. 2 As a result, there is growing recogni-
tion of the need to ensure that putative fathers3 receive early notice of
adoption proceedings and that they fully understand their rights and
responsibilities.4 Achieving these goals requires adoption law re-
forms.5 While they are a small minority, these fathers genuinely want
to parent their infants and they should be given that opportunity.6 On
the other hand, the law must recognize that in most infant adoptions,
the father either wants nothing to do with the child or is willing to
consent to the adoption.7 When drafting new laws, this entire range of
situations must be considered, and the need to notify fathers must be
balanced with the needs of the child, the mother, and the state.8
By examining several different state laws and the balances they have
achieved, this Comment identifies four elements of a good adoption
law. First, putative fathers should be given notice of an adoption in the
beginning of the adoption process. Second, putative fathers should be
required to act promptly, with a time limit on their right to veto the
adoption. Third, the father should be willing and able to assume cus-
tody of the child in order to veto the adoption. Fourth, the state may
choose not to notify the father if there is a risk of harm to the mother
or the child.
The history of fathers' constitutional rights and the extent of those
rights today are explored in Part II of this Comment. Part III uses the
2. See In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992) (granting a biological father
custody of his two-and-a-half year old daughter because his parental rights were never
terminated); In re A.M.P., 507 N.W.2d 616, 619-20 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (granting a
biological father custody of his child because the consent form he signed was ambigu-
ous); In re Raquel Marie X., 559 N.E.2d 418, 428 (N.Y. 1990) (granting a biological
father custody of his child because he came forward promptly and was willing to assume
custody of the child).
3. A putative father is the alleged or supposed father whose parentage is still an
issue, therefore his claim to custody is at issue. STEVEN H. GiIs, LAW DICTIONARY 378
(1984).
4. See infra note 91 for a list of articles addressing the need for adoption reform.
5. Id.
6. See Peter Marks, The Quest of the Fathers: The Courts Know Him as a "Fleeting Impreg-
nator. " Robert Would Prefer to be Called Dad, NEWSDAY (New York) Apr. 1, 1992, § II, at 56
(recounting interviews with adoption professionals on the scope of the issue). "[T]he
upstanding unwed father, who acknowledges paternity when confronted and agrees to
support mother and child, remains the exception." Id.
7. "[I]n most situations ... the alleged father will not respond to the service of
notice, will not file a claim to paternity in a timely manner, and may be willing to sign a
disclaimer of paternal interest." UNIF. ADorION AcT § 3-704 commentary at 138 (Pro-
posed Draft 1993) (on file with the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws).
8. See infra part V for a discussion of the interests that must be balanced.
(Vol. 20
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Schmidt-DeBoer controversy9 as a framework to identify the un-
resolved constitutional questions regarding infants and thwarted fa-
thers. Part IV analyzes the attempts of New York, California, and
Minnesota to resolve those problems. Part V examines the interests
that must be balanced, and Part VI introduces two statutory schemes
that balance these interests: Indiana's notice statute1 o and the Uniform
Adoption Act."t Part VII examines Minnesota's 1994 adoption legisla-
tion and recommends an additional element that should also be in-
cluded in Minnesota's adoption laws.
II. HIsTORicAL RECOGNITION OF FATHERS' RIGHTS
A. Before Constitutional Protections
Historically, unwed and putative fathers had neither a right to notice
of an adoption nor a right to prevent mothers from placing their chil-
dren for adoption.1 2 These fathers had no legal relationship with their
children, who were considered "illegitimate."13 Because the mother
had the right to custody, most states' adoption statutes only required
the mother's consent. 14 This rule applied even when the father ac-
9. In reB.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992). Baby Girl Clausen was the child who
became known nationally as "Baby Jessica." Darlene G. Stevens et al., Adoptive Parents
Fear "Baby Jessica " Legacy, CHI. TRIB., July 24, 1993, at 1.
10. See infra part VI.A.
11. See infra part VI.B.
12. See Note, Father of an Illegitimate Child-His Right to be Heard, 50 MINN. L. Rv.
1071, 1075-76 (1966) (providing an overview of various state adoption statutes).
Some states granted putative fathers an opportunity to be heard but not a right to
veto the adoption. Id. See, e.g., At-A. CODE, tit. 26, § 3 (1958); ARIZ REV. STAT. ANN. § 8-
103A(1)(b) (1956); ARK. STAT. ANN. § 56-106(c) (1947); CA.. Crv. CODE § 224; D.C.
CODE ANN. § 16-304(b)(2)(C) (Supp. V. 1966); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-11-10 (1960);
WASH. REV. CODE § 26.32.030(2) (1951).
Other states specifically excluded the putative father from all proceedings. Note,
supra, at 1076. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-203 (1963); ILL. REv. STAT. ch. 4, § 9.1-8
(1965); Miss. CODE ANN. § 1269-03 (Supp. 1964); N.J. REv. STAT. § 9:3-18(0) (Supp.
1954); TEX. REv. CIrv. STAT. ANN. art. 46a(6) (Supp. 1965).
Most states, however, failed to mention the putative father at all. Note, supra, at
1076. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-2-5 (1953); N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111; PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 1, § 2(c) (1963). See also 2 AM. JUR. 2D Adoption §§ 69-73 (1994) (providing a
general discussion of the requirements of the father's consent).
13. JOAN H. HOLLINGER ET AL., ADOPTION LAw AND PRACTICE §§ 1.03[l],2.04[2] [a]
(1993). For a history of the law regarding mothers and fathers of illegitimate children,
see MICHAEL GROSSBERG, GovERNING THE HEARTH: LAw AND THE FAMILY IN NINETEENTH
CENTURY AMERICA, ch. 7 (1985).
14. See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3), 74-203 (1975) (providing that only the
mother's consent is required for the adoption of an illegitimate child); MINN. STAT.
§ 259.24, subd. l(a) (1959) (amended 1974) (specifically stating that "the consent of the
father of an illegitimate child to an adoption shall not be required"); see also 2 AM. JUR.
2D Adoption § 68 (1994) (providing a general discussion of the requirements of the
mother's consent).
1994]
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knowledged the child as his own, voluntarily supported the child,
wished to assert a right of guardianship, or had been prevented by the
mother from legitimizing the child.15 The father, therefore, had no
rights to veto the adoption of his child.
B. Constitutional Protections
The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution guarantees that no
state shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal
protection of the laws."16 Beginning in 1972, the United States
Supreme Court heard the first of four cases that recognized an unwed
father's relationship with his child as a liberty interest protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment.17 In the second and third decisions, the
Supreme Court limited that liberty interest to fathers who have
"shouldered responsibility"1s for their children and who have devel-
oped "substantial relationships"19 with their children. The last of these
four decisions explained that a father's biological connection to the
child affords him an "opportunity interest," but he must "grasp" his
opportunity in order to obtain constitutional protection.20
1. Stanley v. Illinois
The first Supreme Court decision to recognize the rights of unwed
and putative fathers, Stanley v. Illinois,2 1 was decided in 1972. Peter
Stanley had never married the mother of his children, but they lived
together and raised their children as a family.22 When the mother
died, the State took custody of the children because unwed fathers
15. 2 C.J.S. Adoption of Persons § 58 (1972). A father's consent becomes necessary
for adoption only if the father has legitimized the child. Id.
16. U.S. CONsT. amend. XIV, § 1.
17. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 651-52 (1972). The liberty interest, first ac-
knowledged in Stanley, is the putative father's right to a relationship with his child free
from state interference. See infra note 29 for a history of the family liberty interest.
18. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246 (1978) held that a father who "never
shouldered any significant responsibility with respect to the daily supervision, education,
protection, or care of [his] child" did not have protection under the due process and
equal protection clauses and was not permitted to veto the adoption of the child. Id. at
256 (emphasis added).
19. Caban v. Mohammed, 441 U.S. 380 (1979). The Court held that a father had
developed a "substantial relationship" with his children by living with and supporting
them. Id. at 394.
20. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). The Court held that a father who
failed to establish a "custodial, personal, or financial" relationship with his child had
failed to "grasp" his "opportunity interest." Id. at 267.
21. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
22. Id. at 646-47.
(Vol. 20
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were not included within Illinois' statutory definition of parents.23
Stanley challenged the definition because he had lived with and raised
his children along with their mother.
2 4
The State of Illinois argued that most unmarried fathers are "unsuit-
able and neglectful parents"25 because they are strangers to their chil-
dren. 26 The Court, however, held that the State could not make such a
broad presumption because some unwed fathers were "wholly suited"
to having custody.27 The State also emphasized the need for prompt
procedures, and the Court responded by stating that while this was a
legitimate concern, "the Constitution recognizes higher values than
speed and efficiency."2
8
The United States Supreme Court acknowledged the unwed father's
right to a relationship with his child,29 and stated that the Constitution
protects all family relationships, whether or not they are legitimized by
a marriage ceremony.3 0 "The private interest here, that of a man in
the children he has sired and raised, undeniably warrants deference
and, absent a powerful countervailing interest, protection."31 The
Supreme Court found that the State's actions were impermissible be-
23. Id. at 650. Parents were defined as "the father and mother of a legitimate child,
or the survivor of them, or the natural mother of an illegitimate child, and includes any
adoptive parent." Id. at 650 (citing ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 37, § 714-14).
24. Id. at 646.
25. Id. at 654.
26. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 654 n.6.
27. Id. at 654. The Supreme Court reviews constitutional challenges to state stat-
utes using three standards of review. An intermediate standard is common in gender
issues. Under this standard, the state must show a "legitimate" purpose and the statute
must be "substantially" related to that purpose. Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 76-77
(1971). The Court apparently applied an intermediate standard of review in Stanley
because it found that the State's purpose was legitimate, but the statute was not substan-
tially related to the State's purpose because some fathers were suited to have custody,
and making their children wards of the State would do more harm than good to the
children. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 652-53. For an analysis of the Supreme Court's applica-
tion of the three constitutional standards to putative fathers, see Linda R. Crane, Family
Values and the Supreme Court, 25 CONN. L. REv. 427, 453 n.171 (1993).
28. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 656.
29. Id. at 651. The liberty interest in one's family has been recognized in cases
such as Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923). In that case, the Court protected the
rights of parents to educate their children as they desire. Id. at 399. The Court used
the due process clause to protect a broader, more essential right to conceive and raise
one's children. Id. See also Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 496 (1965) (protect-
ing the privacy of the marriage relationship and finding unconstitutional a law forbid-
ding contraception); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (protecting
marriage and procreation as fundamental rights and finding unconstitutional a statute
providing for sterilization of criminals). The Stanley Court cited each of these cases in
support of extending family liberty to the unwed father and his relationship with his
child. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
30. Stanley, 405 U.S. at 651.
31. Id.
1994]
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cause all parents are entitled to a hearing on their fitness before their
children are removed from their custody.32
Stanley was significant because the Supreme Court protected an un-
wed father's rights and declared that parental fitness could not be de-
termined solely on the basis of marital status. All fathers have a
fundamental liberty interest "in the companionship, care, custody, and
management" of their children.
3 3
2. Quilloin v. Walcott
Six years later, the Supreme Court refused to protect an unwed fa-
ther in Quilloin v. WalCott.34 Leon Quilloin wanted to veto the adop-
tion of his son by the son's stepfather.3 5 However, Quilloin's son was
eleven years old, and Quilloin had never previously sought custody of
him.36 Furthermore, Quilloin had only provided irregular child sup-
port.3 7 Although he had visited his son many times, these contacts
were disruptive, and the son wanted to be adopted by his stepfather.3 8
Georgia law required the consent of only the mother before an ille-
gitimate child could be placed for adoption.3 9 Quilloin claimed that
the statute was unconstitutional under Stanley because it presumed that
unwed fathers were unfit as a matter of law.4 0
On review, the United States Supreme Court recognized the State's
interest in having children reared in traditional family settings.41 Al-
lowing the adoption would not only permit the child to live in such a
setting, but would also allow the child to continue living in the same
place with the same parents. 42 Furthermore, Quilloin only sought to
veto the adoption and acquire visitation rights, he did not ask for cus-
32. Id. at 658.
33. Id. at 651.
34. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
35. Id. at 247.
36. Id. at 253.
37. Id. at 251.
38. Id.
39. Quilloin, 434 U.S. at 248 n.3 (citing GA. CODE ANN. § 74-403(3) (1975)).
40. Id. at 250 n.8.
41. The Court noted that the lower court had "relied generally on the strong State
policy of rearing children in a family setting. . . ." Id. at 252. Quilloin was decided in
1978, and the Court seems to use the terms "family setting" and "family already in exist-
ence" to refer to a traditional family structure that includes both a mother and a father
in the home. The author acknowledges that many people today would also consider
Quilloin and his son to be a family.
42. [T] his [is not] a case in which the proposed adoption would place the child
with a new set of parents with whom the child had never before lived. Rather,
the result of the adoption in this case is to give full recognition to a family unit
already in existence, a result desired by all concerned, except appellant.
Id. at 255.
The Court applied an intermediate scrutiny test since the state's interest in recog-
nizing the existing family unit, which it believed to be in the best interest of the child,
[Vol. 20
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tody rights. 43 The Court held that the Constitution does not protect
an unwed father who "has never exercised actual or legal custody over
his child, and thus has never shouldered any significant responsibility
with respect to the daily supervision, education, protection, or care of
the child.., indeed, he does not even now seek custody of his child."44
3. Caban v. Mohammed
In 1979, the Court used the Quilloin factors of custody and support
to decide Caban v. Mohammed.45 In this case, the father, Abdiel Caban,
had a substantial relationship with his two children.46 He had lived
with his children as their father and had supported them for several
years until he separated from their mother.4 7 Even after the separa-
tion, Caban frequently saw the children.
48
When a stepfather petitioned to adopt the children, Caban filed a
cross petition. 49 Under New York law, a mother could veto an adop-
tion by simply withholding her consent, but an unwed father had no
similar control.50 Since the mother could veto Caban's petition for
adoption, but Caban could not veto the stepfather's petition, the New
York court granted the stepfather's petition.Sl Caban challenged the
law as unconstitutional under the Equal Protection Clause.
52
The United States Supreme Court distinguished the case from Quil-
loin by emphasizing Caban's "substantial relationship"53 with his chil-
dren in contrast to Quilloin's "failure to act as a father."54 Caban had
not only lived with his children for several years before separating from
their mother, but he had also spent time with the children and raised
them after the separation.55 Quilloin, on the other hand, never sought
custody and waited until his son was eleven years old before seeking
visitation rights.56
was substantially related to the law that required only the mother's consent to the adop-
tion. Crane, supra note 27, at 453 n.171.
43. QuiUoin, 434 U.S. at 247, 256.
44. Id. at 256.
45. 441 U.S. 380 (1979).
46. Id. at 382-83.
47. Id. at 382.
48. Id. at 382-83.
49. Id. at 383.
50. Caban, 441 U.S. at 386-87.
51. Id. at 393 n.15.
52. The Court used intermediate scrutiny because the statute discriminated on the
basis of gender. See supra note 27 for an explanation of the intermediate standard of
review; see also Crane, supra note 27, at 453.
53. Caban, 441 U.S. at 393.
54. Id. at 389 n.7.
55. Id. at 382-83.
56. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 253 (1978).
1994]
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The Court again recognized that the State had a legitimate interest
in encouraging the adoption of illegitimate children and noted that
when a father has never come forward to participate in the rearing of
his child, a state may treat him differently and not allow him to veto an
adoption.57 However, when a father has participated in the rearing of
his children, the gender distinction is unconstitutional because a fa-
ther's relationship with his older children may be equal to a mother's
relationship; therefore, the father should be allowed the same veto
rights to an adoption as the mother.58
Accordingly, the Court found the New York statute unconstitutional
and ruled that when an unwed father has established a substantial rela-
tionship with a child and admitted paternity, the state may not treat
the father differently than the mother.5 9
The Court made it clear that this analysis applied to older children.60
The Court stated that in infant adoptions there may be a basis for legiti-
mately giving different rights to mothers and fathers,6 1 but the Court
expressed no view on those rights.62
4. Lehr v. Robertson
The fourth United States Supreme Court case involving the constitu-
tional rights of unwed fathers was Lehr v. Robertson,63 decided in 1983.
Jonathan Lehr challenged New York's notice statute because he was
not given notice when his two-year-old daughter was adopted by her
stepfather.64
57. Caban, 441 U.S. at 389 n.7, 392.
58. Id.
59. Id. at 393.
[I]n cases such as this, where the father has established a substantial relation-
ship with the child and has admitted his paternity, a State should have no
difficulty in identifying the father even of children born out of wedlock. Thus,
no showing has been made that the different treatment afforded unmarried
fathers and unmarried mothers under § 111 bears a substantial relationship to
the proclaimed interest of the State in promoting the adoption of illegitimate
children.
Id. (citations omitted).
60. Id. at 392.
61. This is true "even if unwed mothers as a class were closer than unwed fathers to
their newborn infants .. .even if the special difficulties attendant upon locating and
identifying unwed fathers at birth would justify a legislative distinction between mothers
and fathers of newborns .... " Id. 389, 392.
62. Caban, 441 U.S. at 392 n.11.
63. 463 U.S. 248 (1983).
64. Id. at 252-53. Lehr claimed a due process violation because he was deprived of
notice and an opportunity to be heard. Id. Notice and an opportunity to be heard are
procedural due process issues and the analysis requires the court to balance three factors:
the private interest; the government interest; and the risk of error in the procedure and
the probable value of additional safeguards. See Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 321
(1976).
[Vol. 20
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The statute in question provided for a putative father registry under
which a putative father only needed to mail a postcard to notify the
state of his intent to claim paternity.65 Once on the register the father
was entitled to notice of any pending adoption of his child.66 Lehr did
not notify the registry, and he did not meet New York's alternative no-
tice requirements. 67 Therefore, the State did not give Lehr notice of
the adoption of his daughter, even though the State knew of Lehr's
identity and his whereabouts.
68
The Court held that Lehr had not been denied due process because
the registry was available to him. 69 In addition, the Court found that
Lehr had not been denied equal protection because he did not have a
"custodial, personal, or financial" relationship with his daughter. 70 In
In contrast, the fathers in the first three cases claimed a right to their relationships
with their children and challenged the state statutes on a substantive due process basis.
Therefore, instead of the balancing test, the state had to show that the law was "substan-
tially related" to a "legitimate" state interest. See supra note 27 for the intermediate
standard of review.
65. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 250-51.
66. Id. at 251.
67. New York requires that notice be given to seven classes of possible fathers, in-
cluding: (1) those adjudicated to be fathers by the state of New York; (2) those adjudi-
cated to be fathers by another state; (3) those who filed with the putative father registry;
(4) those named on the child's birth certificate; (5) those who live openly with the
mother and child and hold themselves out to be the father; (6) those identified by the
mother in a sworn written statement; and (7) those married to the mother before the
child is six months old. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAw § 111-a, subd. 2 (McKinney 1988 & Supp.
1994).
68. While Lehr had not sent in a postcard to the registry, he had filed a paternity
petition in another county. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 252. Thejudge who signed the stepfather's
petition to adopt knew of Lehr's pending petition, but granted the stepfather's adop-
tion petition because Lehr was not entitled to notice under New York's notice statutes.
Id. at 253.
69. Id. at 248, 265. Applying the procedural due process balancing test, supra note
64, the Court found New York's procedural requirements to be "adequate" because
Lehr did not yet have a relationship with his daughter while the State had several signif-
icant interests at stake, such as uncomplicated adoption proceedings, the privacy inter-
ests of unwed mothers, avoiding unnecessary controversy, and the finality of adoption
decrees. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262-65. Finally, no additional safeguards could have helped
Lehr since New York's statute already covered most responsible fathers, and the pres-
ence of the putative father registry made the right to notice within Lehr's control. Id. at
264.
70. Id. at 267. Lehr claimed that his rights were violated under the Equal Protec-
tion Clause because New York law "denied him the right to consent to [his daughter's]
adoption and afforded him fewer procedural rights than her mother." Id. at 255. Lehr
argued that while natural mothers were always a constitutionally-protected class, only a
particular group of fathers were protected. Id. at 266.
In rejecting this argument, the Court reasoned that because the mother had
formed a custodial relationship with the daughter and Lehr had not, they were not
similarly situated; thus, equal treatment was not required. Id. at 267. The dissent, how-
ever, disagreed with the majority's characterization of Lehr's relationship with his child
and presented the more unfortunate side of the case. Id. at 268. A factual record was
19941
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doing so, the Court noted the distinction between a "mere biological
relationship" and "an actual relationship of parental responsibility,"
7 1
which it characterized as a relationship with "daily associations" and
"emotional bonds."72
The Court began its analysis by noting that "the rights of the parents
are a counterpart of the responsibilities they have assumed."73 Then,
comparing Lehr with the previous three cases, Justice Stevens wrote
that the relationships in Stanley and Caban were "developed parent-
child relationship [s]," whereas the relationships in Quilloin and Lehr
were merely "potential relationship[s]." 74 The developed relationship
"acquires substantial protection under the Due Process Clause," but
the potential relationship does not merit the same protection.75
The potential relationship is based on the biological connection that
affords a father a unique opportunity to develop a relationship with his
child.76 If a father "grasps that opportunity" and accepts responsibility
for the child, then the Constitution will protect the relationship.
77 If
he fails to grasp his opportunity, the "Constitution will not automati-
cally compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child's best
interests lie."
78
Lehr is the current constitutional standard for unwed fathers' paren-
tal rights. 79 Thus, a father must "grasp" his "opportunity interest"
before his rights will be protected by the Constitution.
never created in this case because Lehr's proceeding was first stayed, then dismissed.
Id. at 271. Lehr alleged that he visited the mother and child in the hospital every day
when the child was born, but the mother concealed her whereabouts from him when
she left the hospital. Id. at 269. Lehr never ceased trying to locate them, and the few
times he did find them, he visited them to the extent the mother would allow. Id.
When the child was two years old, Lehr located them again with the aid of a detective
agency. Id. At that time, Lehr offered to provide financial assistance and to set up a
trust fund for the child, but the mother refused and threatened Lehr with arrest if he
did not stay away. Id. at 248, 269.
71. Id. at 259-60.
72. Id. at 261.
73. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 257.
74. Id. at 261.
75. Id.
76. Id. at 262.
77. Id.
78. Lehr, 463 U.S. at 262. It is important to note that the decision states that the
Constitution will not "automatically" protect his interest. SeeJohn R. Hamilton, The Un-
wed Father and the Right to Know of His Child's Existence, 76 Ky. L.J. 949, 978 (1987-88)
(discussing the implications of the Lehr language and a possible right to notice in some
situations).
79. Lehr is the most recent putative father case from the Supreme Court. See Alex-
andra R. Dapolito, The Failure to Notify Putative Fathers of Adoption Proceedings: Balancing
the Adoption Equation, 42 CATH. U. L. REv. 979, 985-95 (1993).
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III. UNRESOLVED CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
The unwed father's liberty interest in his relationship with his child
is relatively well established under these four Supreme Court decisions.
However, all four cases involved older children, and the Supreme
Court specifically declined deciding when the Constitution protects a
putative father's relationship with an infant child.80 Two unresolved
constitutional questions remain. The first question is what actions are
required for a putative father to "grasp" his opportunity and veto an
infant adoption. The second question is whether a genuinely thwarted
father should be able to veto an adoption, when he has genuinely not
been able to grasp his opportunity.
A. The Father of the Infant Child
Many states have adoption statutes that grant rights to those putative
fathers of infant children who have shown responsibility in specific
ways, such as providing support for their children and visiting regularly
with them.8 1 Minnesota, for example, requires that an adoption be
with the consent of any man who is or was married to the mother, is
named on the birth certificate, substantially supported the child,
openly lives with the mother or the child, was adjudicated to be the
80. In Caban, the Supreme Court specifically reserved the question of infants. 441
U.S. 380, 389, 392 (1979). See supra notes 61-62 and accompanying text.
81. For a summary of each state's statutes addressing when consent is not neces-
sary, see HOLLINGER, supra note 13, at § 1-A. See, e.g., ALAsKA STAT. § 25.23.050 (1991)
(consent not required from a parent who has abandoned the child for six months or
who has failed to communicate with the child and to provide care and support); ARK.
CODE ANN. § 9-9-207 (Michie 1993) (consent not required of a parent who has deserted
a child or who has failed to communicate or provide support for a period of one year);
D.C. CODE ANN. § 16-304 (1991) (consent not required when a parent either cannot be
located or has abandoned the child and voluntarily failed to contribute to the child's
support for six months); HAw. REV. STAT. § 578-2 (1993) (consent not required of par-
ent who has deserted child for 90 days, or who fails to communicate with or provide
support for one year); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 532 (West 1980 & Supp. 1993)
(consent not required of a parent who has willfully abandoned a child or who is unwill-
ing or unable to undertake parental responsibility); MD. CODE ANN., FAM. LAw § 5-312
(1991) (consent not required in independent adoption if it is in the child's best interest
to terminate parental rights); Mo. REv. STAT. § 453.040 (Vernon Supp. 1994) (consent
not required from a parent whose identity is unknown, or from a parent who has will-
fully abandoned or failed for 60 days to support and care for a child under one year of
age); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3107.07 (Page's 1989 & Supp. 1993) (consent not re-
quired of putative father who willfully abandoned or failed to care for and support the
minor, or abandoned the mother during her pregnancy and up to the time of the
surrender of the child); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-30-4.1 to 78-30-5 (1992 & Supp. 1993)
(consent not required of a parent who has not provided support and has made no
effort to do so without good cause, and a rebuttable presumption arises if a parent has
failed to support and communicate with the child for a period of one year); Wis. STAT.
§ 48.415 (1987 & Supp. 1993) (consent not required from parent who has failed to
assume parental responsibility).
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father, or filed a notice of intent to retain parental rights.8 2 All of
these actions are ways in which a father can "grasp" his opportunity by
showing actual responsibility for his child.
Often, the opportunity goes unrealized. Aside from adoptions by
step-parents, nearly half of all adoptions in the United States are infant
adoptions.S3 The adoption is finalized within their first two years,
8 4
but they are usually placed with an adoptive family long before the
adoption is actually finalized.85 Placing a child for adoption shortly
after birth limits the father's opportunity to support the child, live with
the child, or even visit with the child. There is no occasion for him to
"grasp" his opportunity interest. The question remains, then, of what
actions should be required of a putative father in order to "grasp" his
opportunity and veto the adoption of his infant child.
B. The Thwarted Father
In many situations, a putative father either wants nothing to do with
the child or is willing to consent to the adoption.8 6 In a few cases,
however, the father genuinely wants to take responsibility for parent-
ing his child, but he has been thwarted of the opportunity to do so.
Lehr, for example, was a thwarted father; despite his attempts to grasp
his opportunity to parent his child, the mother prevented him from
doing s0. 8 7 Other instances where a father may be thwarted include
situations where the mother does not tell the father about the child's
existence, or where the father may know about the child but not about
the mother's plans to place the child for adoption. A father may also
be unable to provide support because of poverty, illness, or
incarceration.8 8
82. MINN. STAT. § 259.26 subd. l(2)(a)-(f) (1992). See infra part IV.C for a discus-
sion of the statute.
83. There were 24,589 unrelated infant adoptions in the United States in 1986,
accounting for almost half of the unrelated domestic adoptions in that year. NATIONAL
COMM. FOR ADOPTION, ADOPTION FACTBOOK 60 (1989). Special needs children, some of
whom may have been infants, comprised one-fourth of unrelated domestic adoptions,
or 13,568 adoptions. Id. Of the remaining unrelated domestic adoptions, most were
healthy children over age two. Id. In addition, there were 10,019 foreign adoptions.
Id.
84. For purposes of the survey, infants were defined as children under the age of
two. Id.
85. Many factors account for the delay. For example, once a petition to adopt is
filed, it usually takes approximately six months for the adoption to be finalized. In
Minnesota, the time is at least three months. MINN. STAT. § 259.27, subd. 4 (1992). For
a state-by-state breakdown of the lengths of the adoption process, see NATIONAL COMM.
FOR ADorrION, ADOPTION FAcrBooy, 22-33 (1989).
86. See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
87. See supra note 70.
88. These examples of thwarted fathers are discussed in the Uniform Adoption Act.
UNIF. ADOPTION ACT § 2-401 commentary at 66; § 3-704 commentary at 136 (Proposed
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The thwarted father may be willing and able to parent, but if the
child has already been placed for adoption, and especially if the adop-
tion has been finalized, many courts will not disrupt the child's stability
by transferring custody to the father.89 Therefore, the father will lose
custody of the child without ever having a true "opportunity" to de-
velop a relationship with the child.
C. An Example from Iowa
Several controversial cases involving the thwarted father problem
have arisen. In Iowa's Schmidt-DeBoer controversy, In re B.G.C.,90 the
child known as "BabyJessica" was returned to her father after two and
a half years with potential adoptive parents because her father's paren-
tal rights had never been terminated. 91
The child was born on February 8, 1991,92 and the adoptive parents,
the DeBoers, were granted custody on February 25, 1991.93 The
mother's rights were terminated, but the mother knowingly named the
wrong man as the father.94 Once the biological father, Daniel
Draft 1993). See infra notes 237-43 and accompanying text (discussing the thwarted
father).
89. See, e.g., Michael U. v. Jamie B., 705 P.2d 362, 366 (Cal. 1985) (allowing adop-
tive parents to retain custody after child has bonded with them so as not to disrupt
emotional welfare of the child); John E. v. John Doe, 564 N.Y.S.2d 439, 444-45 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1990) (changing custody from adoptive parents to putative father would dis-
turb child's psychological stability). For a comparison of different states' treatment of
thwarted fathers, see Daniel C. Zinman, Father Knows Best: The Unwed Father's Right to
Raise His Infant Surrendered for Adoption, 60 FoRD.Am L. REv. 971, 973, 989-96 (1992).
90. 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992). "B.G.C." represents "Baby Girl Clausen."
91. The controversy resulted in four reported cases. The adoption petition was
originally brought in Iowa. In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992) [hereinafter
B.G. C.]. Following the Iowa Supreme Court's denial of the adoption, the adoptive par-
ents brought another action in Michigan. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 501 N.W.2d 193
(Mich. Ct. App. 1993) [hereinafter In re Clausen], aff'd, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993).
Because Michigan did not have jurisdiction, that action failed, even after appeal to the
Michigan Supreme Court. In re Baby Girl Clausen, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993) [here-
inafter Clausen]. The United States Supreme Court declined to hear the case. DeBoer
v. DeBoer, 114 S.Ct. 1 (1993).
When the adoptive parents, the DeBoers, filed in Michigan, the media created a
flurry of public awareness and called for reform to the adoption laws. See, e.g., Adoption
Code Needed, USA TODAY, Aug. 27, 1993, at 10A; Geoffrey Cowley et al., Who's Looking
After the Interests of Children?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 16, 1993, at 54; Mary Deibel, DeBoers Look
to Supreme Court in Custody Battle, STARTOB (Minneapolis) July 25, 1993, at IA; Timothy
M. Phelps, The Law Wasn't on Jessica's Side, N.Y. NEWSDAY, Aug. 8, 1993, at 3. But see
Michele Ingrassia & Karen Springen, She's not BabyJessica Anymore, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 21,
1994, at 60 (detailing the child's successful adjustment to the move).
92. In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 194.
93. Id.
94. Id. This was not the only problem in the case. Cara Clausen had no counseling
and was apparently offered none at the hospital. Memo from Joan H. Hollinger, Re-
porter for the Uniform Adoption Act, to the National Conference of Commissioners on
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Schmidt, found out about his daughter, he intervened in the adoption
proceeding to attempt to reclaim her.9 5 The intervention was filed
March 27, 1991, exactly thirty days after the infant was placed with the
DeBoers and forty-seven days after her birth.96 When blood tests were
completed in September, they showed a 99.9% probability that
Schmidt was the father and a 0% probability that the man who had
been named by the mother was the father.
97
The State of Iowa has chosen to protect the custodial rights of par-
ents.98 Iowa legislation provides that a father's parental rights cannot
be terminated without a showing of unfitness, abandonment, or volun-
tary relinquishment of parental rights.9 9
In the DeBoer-Schmidt controversy, the adoptive parents, the
DeBoers, tried to show unfitness and abandonment.1 0 0 On September
Uniform State Laws 1 (Aug. 1993) (on file with the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws) [hereinafter Hollinger Memo]. In addition, the lawyer
who facilitated the placement had handled few adoptions and did not explain to Clau-
sen that he was representing the DeBoers, that she might have a right to revoke her
consent within 72 hours of the child's birth, and that she was entitled to be present at
the hearing terminating parental rights. Hollinger Memo at 1-2.
95. In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 194.
96. Id. Schmidt would also have been protected under Minnesota's statutes. See
infra part IV.C. In addition, the mother filed a request to revoke her release of custody
on March 6, 1991, so the DeBoers knew there was a problem just nine days after they
received custody of the child. In re Clausen 501 N.W.2d at 194.
97. In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 194.
98. See Painter v. Bannister, 140 N.W.2d 152 (Iowa 1966), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 949
(1966). In Painter, the Iowa Supreme Court granted custody of a child to the maternal
grandparents rather than to the child's father who was leading a "bohemian" lifestyle in
California. Id. at 158. In reaction to that case, the Iowa legislature amended the state's
termination of parental rights statute in order to better protect parents. See infra note
99 and accompanying text.
99. Iowa's statute for termination of parental rights requires a finding of clear and
convincing proof of one of the following grounds:
1. A parent has signed a release of custody... and the release has not been
revoked.
2. A parent has petitioned for the parent's termination of parental rights
3. A parent has abandoned the child.
4. A parent has been ordered to contribute to the support of the child or
financially aid in the child's birth and has failed to do so without good cause.
5. A parent does not object to the termination after having been given
proper notice and the opportunity to object.
6. A parent does not object to the termination although every reasonable
effort has been made to identify, locate and give notice to that parent ....
7. An adoptive parent requests termination of parental rights and the parent-
child relationship based upon a showing that the adoption was fraudulently
induced.
IOWA CODE § 600A.8 (1981 & Supp. 1994).
Abandonment is defined as "to permanently relinquish or surrender... parental
rights, duties, or privileges." Id. § 600A.2(17) (Supp. 1992). The term includes both
the "intention to abandon and the acts by which the intention is evidenced." Id.
100. In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 194.
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24, 1991, the DeBoers filed a petition to terminate Schmidt's parental
rights, alleging that he was an unfit parent because he had abandoned
Jessica as well as two previous children.O1 The Iowa district court,
however, found that Schmidt's parental rights could not be terminated
because he had not abandoned his daughter.0 2 To the contrary, the
court found that he did all he could once he found out that he might
be her father.03 Therefore, the petition to adopt was denied.104 In
addition, the court held that Iowa law did not allow consideration of
"the best interests of the child" because Schmidt's parental rights were
never terminated. 05
In September 1992, on appeal, the Iowa Supreme Court affirmed
the district court's findings and ordered that custody of the two-and-a-
half-year-old child be transferred to Daniel Schmidt.10 6
IV. ALTERNATIVE STATE SOLUTIONS TO THE UNRESOLVED
CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS
Different states have found different solutions to the problems asso-
ciated with putative fathers. The State of Iowa has chosen to protect
parents unless they have voluntarily relinquished or have abandoned
their child.107 New York and California have adopted standards simi-
lar to each other, but with greater limitations on fathers' rights than in
101. B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 245 (Iowa 1992). At the time of the lawsuit, Schmidt
had a son, age 14, and a daughter, age 12. Id. He had not supported them financially,
and he had not maintained any relationship with either of them. Id.
102. Id. at 246.
103. Id. The Iowa court held that even though Schmidt did not assume responsibil-
ity for the child at first, he did not intend to abandon her since he had not been told
specifically that the child was his. Id. In addition, once Clausen told Schmidt the child
might be his, Schmidt spoke with an attorney and intervened in the adoption. Id.
104. Id. Under Iowa law, an adoption petition shall not be filed until parental rights
have been terminated. IOWA CODE § 600.3(2) (1981). Cara Clausen's (the mother) and
Scott Seefeldt's (the named father) parental rights were terminated, but Daniel
Schmidt's (the biological father) parental rights were never terminated. B.G.C., 496
N.W.2d at 244-45. Therefore, the adoption proceedings were defective from the begin-
ning. Id.
105. Id. at 245. The court admitted that the best interest argument was "very allur-
ing," but held that the law could not be bypassed and parental rights could only be
terminated on the grounds specifically stated in IOWA CODE § 600A.8. Id. The child's
best interests may only be considered if the father contests the adoption after he has
lost his right to veto the adoption. Id.
106. Id. at 246. At this point, the DeBoers filed an action in Michigan that was even-
tually dismissed by the Michigan Supreme Court for lack ofjurisdiction. In re Clausen,
501 N.W.2d 193 (Mich. Ct. App. 1993), aff'd, 502 N.W.2d 649 (Mich. 1993). See also
supra note 91. Jessica lived with the DeBoers for two and a half years, from February
1991 to July 1993, until the United States Supreme Court denied a stay. DeBoer v.
DeBoer, 114 S.Ct. 1 (1993). In the meantime, Daniel Schmidt and Cara Clausen mar-
ried in April 1992. In re Clausen, 501 N.W.2d at 194.
107. See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text.
1994]
15
Zdon: Putative Fathers' Rights: Striking the Right Balance in Adoption
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
Iowa.108 In the opposite direction, Minnesota has recently amended
its statutes to require the consent of additional fathers and providing
those fathers with greater protection.109
A. New York
New York has adjudicated two significant cases involving putative fa-
thers.110 In both cases, the issues were resolved by balancing the fa-
thers' rights against the needs of the children who had already been
placed for adoption.",l
In 1979, in response to the Supreme Court's Caban decision,112 New
York adopted a statute that gave putative fathers the right to veto an
adoption only under specific circumstances.'1S For a child under six
months old, the father must have openly lived with the mother for six
continuous months immediately preceding the child's placement for
adoption, openly acknowledged paternity during this period, and have
paid reasonable pregnancy and birth expenses in accordance with his
means. 1 14 These requirements were thought to provide objective and
unambiguous criteria for determining whether a father intended to
assume responsibility for his child.115
In the first case, In re Raquel Marie X., 1 6 the mother and father had a
tumultuous relationship.'1 7 Shortly after the birth of their second
daughter, the mother placed the baby with an adoption agency.1 18
Later, at the father's insistence, she retrieved the child. 119 However,
she subsequently placed the baby for adoption a second time.120 The
108. See infra parts [V.A. and IV.B.
109. See infra part VII.
110. Robert O. v. Russell FL, 604 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1992); In re Raquel Marie X., 559
N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. 1990) [hereinafter In re Raquel Marie X. II].
111. Robert 0., 604 N.E.2d at 104-05; Raquel Marie X II, 559 N.E.2d at 424, 428.
112. See supra part II.B.3.
113. N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 111(1) (e) (McKinney 1988) (declared unconstitutional
in Raquel Marie X II, 559 N.E.2d at 419).
114. Id.
115. See Raquel Marie X. II, 559 N.E.2d at 422.
116. 559 N.E.2d 418 (N.Y. 1990).
117. Id. at 420. The detailed facts are found in the lower court decision, In reRaquel
Marie X., 545 N.Y.S.2d 379, 380 (N.Y. App. Div. 1989) [hereinafter In re Raquel Marie X.
I. The mother had to obtain an order of support for their first daughter, as well as
several protective orders because of the father's violent conduct. Id. at 380. She also
accused him of raping her and filed at least three separate criminal complaints against
him for assault and violation of the protective orders. Id.
118. Raquel Marie X. I, 545 N.Y.S.2d at 380.
119. Id.
120. Id. The mother eventually married the father, and they both sought to regain
custody of the child. Id. at 381.
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father challenged the adoption, but he could not veto the adoption
because of New York's "living together" requirement.121
The Raquel Marie X. court found the "living together" requirement
unconstitutional because the requirement was only "tangentially" re-
lated to the father's desire to establish a relationship with his child.122
The living together requirement focused on the father's relationship
with the mother, rather than with the child.123 The requirement could
also be used by the mother to cut off the father's rights, even when he
wished to form, or attempted to form, a relationship with his child.124
The court set out a new two-part standard for when a father can veto
an adoption.125 First, the father must act "promptly" once he knows
about the child,126 with that action occurring during the six months
preceding the placement of the child.127 Second, the father must be
willing and able to assume custody of the child and must not be merely
seeking to veto the adoption.1
28
In New York's second putative father case, Robert 0. v. Russell K.,129
the biological mother and father had separated1So The mother did
not tell the father about the pregnancy or the adoption because she
did not want him to feel that she was trying to pressure him into mar-
riage.l13 The mother placed the child for adoption before she and the
father later reconciled and married.13 2 When the father found out
about the child, a year and a half after the placement, he did all he
could to challenge the adoption.133 He claimed that the state had a
duty to ensure that he was notified of the adoption.1 34
121. Id. at 382-83. The statute required the father to openly live with the mother for
six continuous months prior to the placement of the child. See supra note 114 and
accompanying text.
122. Raquel Marie X II, 559 N.E.2d at 426. The court used a strict scrutiny standard
because a liberty interest was at stake, and the State had to show a "powerful counter-
vailing interest" and a "close fit" between that interest and the legislation. Id. at 425.
123. Id. at 426.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 424, 428. The other two provisions from the statute, acknowledgement of
paternity and payment of pregnancy and birth expenses, remained factors to be consid-
ered by the court. Id.
126. Id. at 424.
127. Raquel Marie X. II, 559 N.E.2d at 428.
128. Id. at 424, 428.
129. 604 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1992).
130. Id. at 100.
131. Id. For an interview with the mother and father, see Marks, sup-a note 6, at 56.
132. Robert 0., 604 N.E.2d at 101.
133. The father attempted to meet the statutory requirements by reimbursing the
mother for her medical expenses, filing with the putative father registry, and commenc-
ing an action to vacate the adoption. Id.
134. Id. at 100. Under New York's statutes, he was not entitled to either notice or
consent rights. Id. at 101. The district court never even asked for the name of the
father. Id.
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The court, however, held there was no such duty in this case because
the mother had done nothing to hide the pregnancy and the father
had failed to take any steps to discover the pregnancy or the birth of
the child.'35 When the father did find out, the adoption had already
been finalized for ten months and the child had lived with the adop-
tive parents for a year and a half.136
The court then restricted the Raquel Marie X. standard by ruling that
the "promptness" requirement is measured from the time of the
child's birth, not from the time the father becomes aware of the
child.'1 7 The court stated that the State of New York had a legitimate
interest in the child's need for early permanence and stability13 8 and,
in effect, decided that the State's interest in finalizing the adoption
outweighed the father's interest in establishing a relationship with his
child.139
B. California
California considered a similar situation in In re Kelsey S.140 In this
case, the putative father knew that the mother planned to place the
child for adoption.1 4 1 He wanted to raise the child, so he filed an ac-
tion with the court to establish his parental rights.142 Under California
law at the time, the father could not veto the adoption because he was
not a "presumed father."1 43 A "presumed father" was defined as a man
who receives the child into his home and openly holds out the child as
his own. 144
The California Supreme Court found the law unconstitutional be-
cause it allowed a mother to unilaterally preclude a father from becom-
ing a presumed father.145 Following New York's lead, the California
court held that if a putative father comes forward "promply"146 and
demonstrates "full commitment to his parental responsibilities-emo-
135. Id. at 104-05. Yet, the father may not be any more at fault than the mother.
When the mother found out she was pregnant, she was afraid the father would think
she was trying to pressure him into marriage, and in her anger and fear she told him
she did not want to see him any more. Id. at 100; see Marks, supra note 6, at 56.
136. Robert 0., 604 N.E.2d at 101.
137. Id. at 103-04.
138. Id. at 104.
139. Id.
140. 823 P.2d 1216 (Cal. 1992).
141. Id. at 1217.
142. Id. at 1217-18.
143. Id. at 1218-19.
144. Id. at 1220 (citing Cal. Civ. Code § 7004(a) (4) (1983)).
145. Kelsey S., 823 P.2d at 1236.
146. Id. The court added that all factors should be considered, including the fa-
ther's conduct before the birth of the child. Id. Once he knows or reasonably should
know about the child, then he must act promptly to assume parental responsibilities.
Id. at 1236-37.
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tional, financial, and otherwise,"14 7 then the Federal Constitution will
protect him by requiring a showing of unfitness before his parental
rights can be terminated.14
8
In summary, California and New York have both imposed time limits
on the rights of a putative father. Those states will grant a putative
father custody of his child only if he acts "promptly." In addition, they
have specified what actions he must take. He must be willing and able
to assume custody of the child.1
49
C. Minnesota
Minnesota protects putative fathers by giving them statutory rights to
receive notice and to consent to the adoption. In 1994, the Minnesota
Legislature amended the adoption statutes to encourage more birth
mothers to give notice to putative fathers.150 The statutes were
amended even though Minnesota's laws on notice and consent have
not been constitutionally challenged.a5 1
The categories of fathers who are legally entitled to receive notice
are the same as they were before the 1994 amendments, and they are
contained in two statutes.' 5 2 One is in the Parentage Act153 and the
other is the adoption statutes.1 54 Minnesota law details who is entitled
to notice, and then states that consent is required from the same fa-
thers who are entitled to notice.155 The Parentage Act requires that
notice be given to a presumed father, such as a man who is or was
147. Again relying on the New York court's decision in Raquel Marie X II, the Kelsey
S. court held that the father must be willing to assume full custody of the child and not
be merely trying to veto the adoption. Id. at 1237 (citing In re Raquel Marie X. II, 559
N.E.2d 418, 428 (N.Y. 1990)).
148. Id. at 1236.
149. Id.; Robert 0. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 103-04 (N.Y. 1992). In contrast to
these two states, the District of Columbia Court of Appeals has ruled that even if the
father has acted timely, the adoptive parents can overcome his right with clear and
convincing evidence that an adoption would serve the best interests of the child. In re
Baby Boy C., 581 A.2d 1141, 1143 (D.C. 1990).
150. See infra part VII for a detailed description and analysis of the 1994
amendments.
151. SeeJudith D. Vincent, Adoption: What in the World is Going On?, 6 MINN. FAM. L.J.
64, 65 (1993). "Questions have been raised, though never addressed in Minnesota, as
to whether statutes which limit a birth father's time to assert his claims are constitu-
tional under due process criteria." Id. The Retention of Rights statute, MINN. STAT.
§ 259.261 (1992), was a minor issue in a 1993 case where the father was allowed to
revoke his consent to termination of parental rights because the form he signed was
contradictory. In re A.M.P., 507 N.W.2d 616, 620-21 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). In that
case, the court ruled that filing with the county within the proper period satisfied the
requirement for filing with the state under the Retention of Rights statute. Id. at 621.
152. See infta notes 260-63 and accompanying text.
153. MINN. STAT. § 257.74 (1992).
154. Id. § 259.26 (1992).
155. Id. § 259.24 (1992).
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married to the mother.156 If there is no presumed father, notice is
given according to the adoption statutes.157 The adoption statutes re-
quire that notice be given to a putative father in six situations: (1) his
name appears on the child's birth certificate; (2) he has substantially
supported the child; (3) he was married to the mother 325 days before
the child's birth or within ten days after the birth; (4) he is openly
living with the mother or the child or both; (5) he was adjudicated to
be the father; or (6) he has filed a notice of his intent to retain his
parental rights according to the Retention of Rights statute.158 If a
father does not fit one of these categories, then he is not entitled to
notice of the adoption.
A putative father who is not entitled to notice under the Parentage
Act or the adoption statutes may turn to the Retention of Rights stat-
ute.1 59 This statute allows a father who is not otherwise entitled to
notice to file an affidavit of his intent to retain parental rights.160 The
affidavit must be filed within ninety days of the birth of the child or
within sixty days of the child's placement for adoption, whichever is
sooner. 16 1 If the affidavit is not filed, the father will not receive notice
and his parental rights will be terminated.1 62 If the affidavit is filed,
the mother then has sixty days to deny paternity and to file a petition
challenging the father. 163 The mother must prove that he is not the
father in order for him to lose his rights.' 6 4 If the father is not chal-
156. Pursuant to MINN. STAT. § 257.55 (Supp. 1993), a man is presumed to be the
biological father if: (1) he is or has been married to the mother, and the child is born
during the marriage, or within 280 days after the marriage is terminated by death, an-
nulment, declaration of invalidity, dissolution, or divorce, or after a decree of legal
separation is entered by a court; (2) before the child's birth, he "attempted" to marry
the mother in apparent compliance with the law; (3) after the child's birth, he and the
mother married or "attempted" to marry and (a) he acknowledged paternity in a writ-
ing filed with the state registrar of vital statistics, (b) consented to being named as the
father on the birth certificate, or (c) is obligated to support the child under written
voluntary promise or by court order; (4) he has received the child into his home as his
own; (5) he and the child's mother acknowledged paternity under § 257.34 in writing
and filed with the state registrar of vital statistics; (6) he is likely to be the father based
on blood testing; (7) he and the mother executed a recognition of parentage under
§ 257.75 even though another man is presumed to be the father under this section; and
(8) he and the mother executed a recognition of parentage under § 257.75 even
though another man and the mother have also executed a recognition of parentage.
Id.
157. MINN. STAT. § 259.26 (1992).
158. Id., subd. 1(2) (a)-(f).
159. MINN. STAT. § 259.261, subd. 1 (1992). The Retention of Rights statute is other-
wise known as the "60/90 Day Statute."
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id.
163. Id., subd. 3.
164. MINN. STAT. § 259.261, subd. 3 (1992).
[Vol. 20
20
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 3 [1994], Art. 8
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol20/iss3/8
PUTATIVE FATHERS AND ADOPTION
lenged, his claim of paternity becomes conclusive evidence of his
parenthood. 165
In summary, a father that is not entitled to notice under the Parent-
age Act or the adoption statutes must take the responsibility upon him-
self to file a notice of intent to retain parental rights. Moreover, in
light of the four United States Supreme Court decisions, the law only
protects those fathers who have "grasped" their opportunity interest in
developing a relationship with their child.166
The Retention of Rights statute has not resolved all of the problems
associated with putative fathers. If a father does not know about the
child, then he has no reason to file an affidavit. If the affidavit is not
filed, the father's parental rights will be terminated ninety days from
the birth or sixty days from the placement, whichever is sooner.167
Thus, the statute may cut off a putative father's rights before he ever
knows he has a child.
V. BALANCING THE INTERESTS
In finding a solution to the problems associated with the putative
father, the father's opportunity interest must be balanced against the
rights and interests of the other parties involved in the adoption pro-
ceeding. These other parties include the child, the mother, and the
state.' 68 Since notifying the father often significantly delays the adop-
tion, the interests must be balanced to achieve a workable solution for
all of the parties involved. 169
The putative father who genuinely wants to parent his child and as-
sume full custody should be given notice of the adoption so that he
may "grasp" his opportunity to develop a relationship with the child
before it is too late. However, that opportunity should be limited by
the rights and needs of the other parties. First, because of the child's
need for early stability, 170 the opportunity should be limited in time by
requiring the father to act promptly in making his decision. Second,
165. Id.
166. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text.
167. MINN. STAT. § 259.261, subd. 1 (1992).
168. The states's interest also encompasses the interests of adoptive parents, for
even though adoptive parents are also parties to an adoption, they often have few, if
any, legal rights. SeeJanet Hopkins Dickson, The Emerging Rights of Adoptive Parents: Sub-
stance or Specter? 38 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 917 (1991).
169. Jenniferj. Raab, Lehr v. Robertson, Unwed Fathers and Adoption-How Much Process
is Due? 7 HARv. WOMEN'S L.J. 265, 277 (1984). The constitutional analysis also requires
a balancing of the interests. The thwarted father problem is a procedural due process
issue because the father has not been given notice of the adoption. As applied in Lehr,
the Mathews v. Eldridge formula requires the court to balance the interests of all the
parties. Mathews, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976). For a discussion of how the Lehr court
applied the Mathews formula, see supra notes 64, 69.
170. See infra notes 176-78 and accompanying text.
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because of the child's need for parents who are fully committed to
caring for the child,171 the opportunity should be limited to fathers
who are willing to assume full custody of and full responsibility for the
child. Those putative fathers who merely want to veto the adoption
should not be allowed to prevent the adoption of the child.172 Third,
because of the safety needs of the mother and the child, special consid-
eration should be given to those situations where the father has a his-
tory of harmful behavior toward the mother or toward other children,
including a history of abuse, violence, rape, or incest.
A. The Interests
Four parties have interests that must be considered and balanced in
order to find a solution to the problems associated with putative fa-
thers. These four parties are: the father, the child, the mother, and
the state.
1. The Interests of the Father
Putative fathers should be notified early in the adoption process.
Although it is clear that the father's opportunity interest will only be
protected when it has been "grasped,"173 this opportunity should not
be taken away without at least providing the father with notice of his
potential loss and an opportunity to grasp his interest in taking on the
responsibilities and rights of fatherhood.1
74
This requirement is derived from the elementary rule that the state
may not cut off people's constitutional ... interests without letting
them know of its proposed action so that they may have an opportu-
nity to argue against the loss of their interests. If a father has a viable
opportunity interest in establishing a relationship with his child, the
171. See infra note 177 and accompanying text.
172. When the father is allowed to veto an adoption with no requirement that he
assume custody, the mother is left raising the child by herself or the child is left linger-
ing in foster care. Birth fathers often interfere not because they want the child, but
because they want to prevent the birth mother from making adoption plans. Judith
Vincent, The DeBoer Adoption Case-Minnesota Style, (Minnesota State Bar Ass'n
Continuing Legal Education, New Developments in Family Law, November 1993)
(video 4 of 4).
173. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing Lehr and the current
constitutional standard).
174. See Elizabeth Buchanan, The Constitutional Rights of Unwed Fathers Before and After
Lehr v. Robertson, 45 OHio ST. L.J. 313, 351, 353-56, 367 (1984); Hamilton, supra note 78,
at 953-58, 998-1000, 1008-09. "The opportunity to develop this liberty interest is obvi-
ously cut off if the father is not informed of his child's existence." Hamilton, supra at
988. Since the relationship between the father and child is critical, "the state may not
prevent the. development of a custodial relationship by denying an unwed father an
opportunity to have custody.. . ." Buchanan, supra at 351-52.
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state may not terminate his interest by decreeing adoption without
giving the father an opportunity to make his claim.
1 75
2. The Child's Interests
Children need stable and secure relationships and environments in
order to grow and develop fully.176 When a child is forced to move
from one family to another, the change can be harmful to the child's
future development, with different consequences for children of differ-
ent ages. 177 When balancing the interests of all the parties, the child's
need for quick and permanent placement must be considered because
the child is the most important party in the adoption proceeding.' 78
3. The Mother's Interests
Mothers also have rights and interests in the balance, the most im-
portant of which is the fight to privacy.1 79 The right to privacy is a
right to be free from governmental interference in child raising and
175. Buchanan, supra note 174, at 355. Due process requires "notice reasonably cal-
culated, under all the circumstances, to apprise interested parties of the pendency of
the action and afford them an opportunity to present their objections." Mullane v.
Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 314 (1950).
176. Children have both physical and emotional needs, and their "primary emo-
tional need is for permanence and stability." Buchanan, supra note 174, at 364.
177. For a discussion of a child's need for continuity and the implications of that
need on the adoption process, see JOSEPH GOLDSTEIN ET AL., BEYOND THE BEST INTER-
ESTS OF THE CHILD 31-35 (1973). See also Robert S. Rausch, Note, Unwed Fathers and the
Adoption Process, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV. 85, 105-09, 114 (1980) (suggesting that the
child's psychological needs should play an integral role in the adoption process).
For current studies on the effects of separation on children, see Patricia A. Nach-
man, The Maternal Representation: A Comparison of Caregiver-and Mother-Reared Toddlers, in
46 THE PSYCHoANALYrIc STUDY OF THE CHILD 69 (1991) (observing the effects of separa-
tion from working mothers on children aged 17 to 36 months). See also Alan I.
Sugawara, Selected Child Factors Moderating the Impact of Maternal Absence on Children's Be-
havior and Development, 72 EARLY CHILD DEVELOPMENT AND CARE 1 (1991) (reviewing
research which finds that various factors influence a child's reactions to maternal ab-
sence, including the child's age, sex, genetics, temperament, cognitive abilities, self-
esteem, social supports, and other stress factors). For a list of additional sources, see
Iris H. Cornelius, Ph.D. L.P., The DeBoer Adoption Case-Minnesota Style, (Minne-
sota State Bar Ass'n, Continuing Legal Education, New Developments in Family Law,
November 1993).
178. Adoption laws must take the child's needs into consideration because, unfortu-
nately, children have few constitutional or legal rights of their own. Responding to the
adoption controversy, Dr. James Merikangas, Yale professor of psychiatry, stated that
"[a]t present, although we have a Constitution and a Bill of Rights, it doesn't apply to
children. We need to have a constitutional amendment that specifically lists what rights
children have." Alison Young, Emotional Cases Heat Up Debate On Rights, Support Grows To
Give Children More Of A Say, DETROIT FREE PRESs, Sept. 12, 1993, at 5F.
179. See, e.g., Rausch, supra note 177, at 123.
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family related decisions such as education,180 contraception,' 8 ' and
abortion. 1
82
Most recently, the right to privacy has been expanded to include a
woman's right to make child bearing decisions regardless of the fa-
ther's wishes.18 3 Since a woman has this privacy right in child bearing
decisions, she should have a similar right in child rearing decisions.'
8 4
One fundamental child rearing decision is the placement of a child for
adoption without interference from the father.
4. The State's Interests
When an adoption is contested, the state usually has an interest at
stake as well. 185 For instance, in Robert 0. v. Russell K.,186 the State of
New York had an interest in protecting the finality of the adoption
when the adoption had been final for ten months and the child had
lived with the adoptive parents for a year and a half.187 Other state
interests recognized in the case included protecting the child's stabil-
ity, protecting the mother's privacy right, and maintaining efficiency
for the state.' 88 The Robert 0. concurrence analyzed each of the State's
interests and concluded that although protecting the finality of the
adoption, the stability of the child, and the privacy of the mother were
legitimate State interests,189 maintaining efficient adoption proceed-
ings was not a State interest worthy of protection. 190
180. Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 401 (1923).
181. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965).
182. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
183. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 69 (1976); see also Hamilton,
supra note 78, at 990.
184. See Raab, supra note 169, at 278 (detailing additional arguments in support of
the mother's right to make child rearing decisions).
185. This section of this Comment addresses the state's interests in infant adoptions.
The state plays a different role in stepparent adoptions because the state is validating an
already existing family unit, as opposed to creating a new family unit. Buchanan, supra
note 174, at 364, 366. See supra part II.B., the Supreme Court cases, for a discussion of
the state's interests in stepparent adoption cases.
186. 604 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1992).
187. See supra notes 129-39 and accompanying text. In effect, the state protects the
interests of the child and the adoptive parents because they have no rights of their own.
See supra notes 168, 178.
188. Robert 0., 604 N.E.2d at 104-05 (citing In rejessica XX., 430 N.E.2d 896 (N.Y.
1981) (Cooke, Ch. J., dissenting); In re Christopher L., 450 N.Y.S.2d 269 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1982)).
189. Robert 0., 604 N.E.2d at 106-08. The Supreme Court reached the same conclu-
sion in Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 284 (1983). See supra note 69 and accompany-
ing text.
190. Id. at 108. This analysis comports with the United States Supreme Court's find-
ing in Stanley v. Illinois that efficiency was not a legitimate state interest where father's
rights were concerned. 405 U.S. 645, 656 (1972). Although efficiency for the state may
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B. Balancing the Interests
The father's right to notice of the adoption of his child is important
and should be protected. In doing so, however, the interests of the
father must be balanced against the interests of the child, the mother,
and the state.
1. The Father and the Child
A conflict between the interests of the father and the interests of the
child often arises when the father does not find out about the child
until after the child has been placed for adoption. 191 The father then
challenges the adoption, but, as the challenge proceeds through the
court system, the child remains with the adoptive parents, bonding
with them and becoming a part of their family. Children need stability
and permanence, and the state has an interest in ensuring that these
needs are met.1 92 Because the child usually remains with the adoptive
parents throughout the court proceedings, the father is precluded
from establishing his own bonds with the child.193
The interests of the father and child, however, do not have to con-
flict.194 The child's need for stability can be balanced with the father's
interests. First, the father should be notified of the adoption plans at
the beginning of the adoption process so that any chance of conflict
can be addressed early in the proceedings. 195 Second, the father's op-
not be a legitimate goal, efficiency and speed for the sake of the child should be
considered.
191. This was the case in In re B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239 (Iowa 1992) (discussed supra
part III.C). See also Robert O. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99 (discussed supra notes 129-39
and accompanying text).
192. See supra notes 176-78 and accompanying text. The Robert 0. court indicated
that the state of New York had a legitimate interest in protecting the finality of
adoptions.
193. In effect, the father cannot win. See Zinman, supra note 89 at 986-89 (stating
that courts are often reluctant to deny adoption and grant custody to a putative father
for fear that removing the child from the adoptive parents will traumatize the child).
194. Id. at 996. The responsible father's rights and the child's best interests conflict
only after the state grants temporary custody to the adoptive family and allows the child
to become attached to them. Id. Before the child is placed for adoption, the state's
only interest is in providing a home for the child, and in doing so quickly and efficiently
so that the child will have a stable environment. At this point, before the actual place-
ment, the father's interest in raising his child is equal to, if not greater than, the state's
interest in providing a home. Id. Zinman recommends that temporary custody should
be granted to the father while the case is pending and that courts need to expedite the
adjudication of putative fathers' rights. Id.
195. "Since courts are generally reluctant to remove a child from an adoptive home
once the child is placed, the time to protect the putative father's due process rights is
prior to an adoption placement." Dapolito, supra note 79, at 982. With the growing
acceptance of nontraditional families and the increasing numbers of putative fathers
attempting to exercise their parental rights, the father's interest must be handled effi-
ciently at the beginning of the adoption proceedings. Id. at 983.
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portunity to develop a relationship with the child should be limited in
time and in extent.
The first limitation, the limitation in time, has been recognized in
several important cases. Lehr was the first Supreme Court decision to
recognize the need for prompt action.196 The Court found that Lehr
had waited too long, even though his daughter was only two years
old.197 New York and California both require "prompt" action by a
putative father, as evidenced by the New York Appellate Court decision
in Raquel Marie X. II.198 and by the California Supreme Court decision
in Kelsey S.199 Minnesota also requires prompt action in the Retention
of Rights statute, 20 0 which requires fathers who are not entitled to no-
tice to act within sixty days of placement or ninety days of the child's
birth, whichever is sooner. 201 The Uniform Adoption Act would also
require a father to act promptly once he either knows or should know
of the child.202
The second limitation, the limitation in extent, would limit the op-
portunity to those fathers who are willing and able to assume legal and
physical custody of the child. This requirement ensures that the
child's needs for stability and commitment are met. The custody re-
quirement was first articulated in Quilloin v. Walcott,203 where the
Court refused to protect Quilloin's parental rights because he only
sought visitation rights, not custody of the child.204 New York and Cali-
fornia also require that the father seek custody of the child and not
merely seek to veto the adoption.205 Finally, the Uniform Adoption
Act would require a genuinely thwarted father to be willing and able to
assume legal and physical custody of a child.206
In summary, the interests of the father and the child can be bal-
anced by ensuring that the father receives notice of the adoption, but
also by requiring the father to act promptly and be willing and able to
assume custody of the child. The father will then have a chance to
grasp his opportunity interest, and the child's final placement can be-
come permanent as quickly as possible.
196. See supra notes 63-79 and accompanying text.
197. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 263 (1983).
198. In re Raquel Marie X. II, 559 N.E.2d 418, 424 (N.Y. 1990).
199. In re Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236-37 (Cal. 1992).
200. MINN. STAT. § 259.261 (1992).
201. Id., subd. 1; see also supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
202. UNIF. ADoPTION Act § 3-704, at 131 (Proposed Draft 1993). See infra note 241
and accompanying text.
203. 434 U.S. 246 (1978).
204. Id. at 256; see supra notes 43-44 and accompanying text.
205. See supra notes 128, 147 and accompanying text.
206. UNIF. ADOPTION Acr § 3-704(b), at 132 (Proposed Draft 1993). See infra note
241 and accompanying text.
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2. The Father and the Mother
The mother has an advantage because she can refuse to inform the
putative father of the pregnancy and she can refuse to provide the
name of the father to those who are facilitating the adoption. In these
situations, the father will never have an opportunity to grasp unless he
has a legal right to notice.
On the one hand, some courts have expressed a belief that the
mother's right to privacy in adoption matters should be protected so
that she is the one who decides whether or not the putative father will
be notified.20 7 On the other hand, some commentators argue that the
mother's privacy right should be balanced with the father's opportu-
nity interest.208 When balanced, these interests do not necessarily
need to conflict. Instead, they should be viewed as two ways to serve
the child's best interests.20 9 The child's interests may be best served by
a caring father who genuinely wants to raise his child. A court should
be able to take the father into consideration and weigh all the options
for the child.210
Therefore, unless there are exceptional circumstances, the mother
should not be able to unilaterally cut off the putative father's opportu-
nity interest.2 1 1 He should be given notice of the adoption and a lim-
ited chance to grasp his opportunity interest.212 In some exceptional
207. See B.G.C., 496 N.W.2d 239, 241 (Iowa 1992); Robert 0. v. Russell K., 604
N.E.2d 99, 100 (N.Y. 1992). The Robert 0. concurrence opined that "no law could, or
should, be written to prevent women such as [the mother] from making the very per-
sonal and human choice to withhold information about their pregnancies from the
men whom they know are the biological fathers." Robert 0., 604 N.E.2d at 108 (Titone,
J. concurring). See also Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 264 n.21 (1983). The Lehr
Court recognized the privacy interests of unwed mothers by referencing Roe v. Norton,
422 U.S. 391 (1975). In Norton, the mother challenged a Connecticut statute requiring
her to name the father of her children in order to receive Aid to Families with Depen-
dent Children (AFDC). Id. at 392. The state Legislature, however, amended the statute
while the case was on appeal, so the Supreme Court did not make a ruling on the
mother's right to privacy. Id. at 393-94.
208. See, e.g., Hamilton, supra note 78, at 990-91; Raab, supra note 169, at 278-79;
Rausch, supra note 177, at 122-30.
209. Raab, supra note 168, at 279.
210. Id.
211. The New York Appellate Court determined in In re Raquel Marie X. II. that a
mother should not be able to unilaterally determine the rights of the putative father.
559 N.E.2d 418, 426 (N.Y. 1990). For a complete discussion of the case, see supra notes
116-28 and accompanying text.
212. An adoption statute must consider who will bear the burdon of establishing his
interest. Statutes that require notice to be given to a father place a burden on the
mother or the facilitator of the adoption to identify the father and to seek him out so
that he may be notified. Statutes that do not give notice to a father effectively place a
burden on the father to find out whether a child was conceived during his relationship
with a woman. This burden is sometimes legitimate because the Supreme Court has
stated in Lehr that rights only come with responsibilities. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S.
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circumstances, however, the physical safety and emotional well-being
of the mother and child may be at risk. For instance, when the father
has a history of abuse or rape. In these situations, the mother's privacy
rights should outweigh the father's right to notice and the adoption
should be allowed to proceed without his involvement.213
3. The Father and the State
Once an adoption is finalized, the state's interest in finalizing adop-
tions may outweigh the rights of putative fathers.214 Nevertheless, if
the state would notify the father at the beginning of the process, then
the father could make the choice to act promptly to "grasp" his oppor-
tunity interest before the adoption is finalized. His opportunity inter-
est would then be protected and the problem would be resolved before
it was too late. Since "grasping the opportunity interest" is critical to
the father's rights, the state should not be able to deny the father a
chance to grasp this opportunity.215
VI. LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
A legislative solution is needed to achieve a fair balance of the inter-
ests of all of the parties. While several states have case law that governs
adoption proceedings, cases arise by chance and take a long time to
resolve. A statute, on the other hand, can be enacted quickly and re-
solve many potential disputes at one time. A few states have enacted
statutes that achieve a good balance between the parties. The Indiana
statute provides an excellent example of such a statute. The National
Council of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws has also drafted a
Uniform Adoption Act that, if promulgated, would create some uni-
formity among the various state adoption laws.
248, 261 (1983). On the other hand, this burden is sometimes unrealistic because short
term relationships have become acceptable in today's society and because the mother
sometimes chooses to keep the knowledge of the pregnancy from the father, unilater-
ally denying him the opportunity to know and raise his child.
213. See, e.g., N.M. STAT. ANN. § 32A-5-19(c) (Michie 1989) (consent not required
from biological father if child is conceived by rape or incest); see also UNIF. ADOPTION
Acr § 3-704 (a) (3), at 132 (Proposed Draft 1993) (allowing courts to terminate paren-
tal rights of alleged parents who have been convicted of a crime of violence or of violat-
ing a restraining or protective order); Id. § 3-704 (b) (3) (allowing courts to terminate
the parental rights of a parent or genuinely thwarted father if there is a risk of substan-
tial physical or psychological harm to the child because of the circumstances of the
child's conception, the behavior of the father during the mother's pregnancy or after
the child's birth, or the father's behavior towards other children).
214. See Robert 0., 604 N.E.2d at 101 (allowing child to stay with adoptive parents
because the adoption had been final for ten months); Raquel Marie X. I, 545 N.Y.S.2d at
382-83 (giving father custody because he challenged the adoption before it was final).
215. Buchanan, supra note 174, at 351-52. "[T]he state must at least give all biologi-
cal parents equal opportunities to establish and maintain protected relationships with
their children." Id. at 352.
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A. Indiana Statute Section 31-3-1-6.1
The best way to protect both the father and the child is to give the
father notice of the adoption and to determine his intentions toward
his child as early as possible. To that end, Indiana has enacted an
Adoption Procedures statute which effectively balances interests of the
father, the mother, and the child. First, the father must take some
responsibility by registering with the putative father registry.2 16 If he
does not register, and if the mother does not disclose the identity or
address of the father, then the putative father is not entitled to notice
of the adoption.217 Second, if the father has registered, then when the
mother names him as the father, he is entitled to notice of the adop-
tion. Third, if he wishes to contest the adoption, he must file either a
motion to contest or a paternity action within thirty days.2 18 In addi-
tion, if he files a motion to contest, he must appear at the hearing to
216. If the father has registered with the putative father registry, then he is entitled
to actual notice. IND. CODE § 31-3-1-6.1(c) (Supp. 1993).
217. Id. § 31-3-1-6.1(h).
218. The Indiana Codes states:
Sec. 6.1 (b) If the mother has provided an attorney or agency arranging an
adoption with the name and address of a putative father who has:
(1) failed or refused to consent to the adoption of the child; or
(2) not had the parent-child relationship terminated under IC 31-6-5;
the putative father is entitled to receive notice of the adoption proceedings
under Rule 4.1 of the Indiana Rules of Trial Procedure.
Sec. 6.1 (f) Notice of the adoption proceeding shall be given to the putative
father who is entitled to notice under subsection (b) or (c) in substantially the
following form:
NOTICE TO NAMED FATHER
- (putative father's name), who has been named the father of the child
born to - (mother's name) on - (date), or who claims to be the father
of the child born to - (mother's name) on - (date), is notified that a
petition for adoption of the child was filed in the office of the clerk of
court, - (address of the court).
If - (putative father's name) wishes to contest the adoption of the child he
must file a motion to contest the adoption in accordance with IC 31-3-1-6.3 in
the above named court, or a paternity action under IC 31-6-6.1 within thirty
(30) days after the date of service of this notice.
If - (putative father's name)
(1) does not file:
(A) a motion to contest the adoption; or
(B) a paternity action under IC 31-6-6.1; within thirty (30) days after
service of this notice; or
(2) after filing a paternity action under IC 31-6-6.1 fails to establish pater-
nity within a reasonable period as determined by the paternity court
under IC 31-6-6.1-2.2; the above named court will hear and determine the
petition for adoption. His consent will be irrevocably implied and he will
lose his right to contest either the adoption or the validity of his implied
consent to the adoption. He will lose his right to establish his paternity of
the child under IC 31-6-6.1.
Id. § 31-3-1-6.1(0.
The second form for giving notice is available for an unnamed father whose child
was conceived outside of the State of Indiana. This form is essentially the same, how-
ever, it allows for notice by publication. Id. § 31-3-1-6.1(e).
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contest the adoption, and if he files a paternity action, he must estab-
lish paternity in the action. 219 If the father does not act or does not
follow through by appearing at the hearing to contest the adoption or
the hearing to establish his paternity, his inaction is considered an ir-
revocable consent to the adoption.220
Indiana's statute follows the Supreme Court's test of requiring a pu-
tative father to "grasp his opportunity interest" by requiring the father
to take actions evidencing his responsibility toward the child.221 He
must first sign the registry, then he must file a motion, and finally, he
must appear at a hearing and successfully contest the adoption or es-
tablish paternity.
While the statute protects the putative father's opportunity interest
by giving him notice, it also limits his interest by requiring him to grasp
it promptly.222 A father must sign the registry before the adoption be-
gins, and then he must make a decision within thirty days of receiving
notice.223 This requirement protects the father by giving him thirty
days to take action. It also protects the child because disputes will be
dealt with quickly, thus ensuring the child's need for early
permanence.
The statute does not require that the father be willing to assume
custody, but it does provide that if the father challenges the adoption,
by either a motion to contest or by a paternity action, he must actually
follow through and appear at the hearing to contest the adoption or
establish paternity. 224 This requirement of legal action demonstrates a
significant step toward ensuring that the father is genuinely interested
in raising the child and not merely trying to veto the adoption.
219. Id. § 31-3-1-6.1(m).
(m) A putative father's consent to adoption is irrevocably implied without fur-
ther court action if the putative father:
(1) fails to file a motion to contest the adoption in accordance with sec-
tion 6.3 of this chapter and fails to file a paternity action under IC 31-6-
6.1 within thirty (30) days after service;
(2) having filed a motion to contest the adoption in accordance with sec-
tion 6.3 of this chapter, fails to appear at the hearing set to contest the
adoption;
(3) having filed a paternity action under IC 31-6-6.1, fails to establish
paternity in the action within a reasonable period determined under IC
31-6-6.1-2.2; or
(4) is required to but fails to register with the putative father registry es-
tablished under IC 31-3-1.5 within the period under IC 31-3-1.5-12.
Id. § 31-3-1-6.1(m)(1)-(4).
220. IND. CODE § 31-3-1-6.1(h). (Supp. 1993), as amended by Pub. L. No. 100-1994,
§ 5.
221. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983); see also supra notes 73-79 and ac-
companying text.
222. See supra notes 126, 146 and accompanying text (discussing the New York and
California "prompt" requirements).
223. IND. CODE § 31-3-1-6.1(f); see supra note 218 for the language of the statute.
224. Id. § 31-3-1-6.1 (m); see supra note 219 for the language of the statute.
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B. The Uniform Adoption Act
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
has drafted a new Uniform Adoption Act in response to the need for
adoption law reform.2 25 The Act incorporates the rights of fathers es-
tablished in the four Supreme Court decisions on adoption2 26 and ad-
dresses the unresolved constitutional issues of infants and thwarted
fathers.2 27 The rights of fathers arise in three different sections: Per-
sons Whose Consent to Adoption is Required,2 2 8 Notice of Pendency
of Proceeding,22 9 and Grounds for Terminating Relationship. 230
In section 2-401, Persons Whose Consent to Adoption is Required,
consent is required from several categories of putative fathers, includ-
ing those who were married to the mother, those who have legally es-
tablished paternity, and those who have actually developed
relationships with their children.2 31 In section 2-402, consent is not
required of those putative fathers whose parental rights have been ter-
minated or who have failed to respond to notice within thirty days. 23 2
In section 3-401, Notice of Pendency of Proceeding, notice must be
served on putative fathers whose consent is required, who claim to be
fathers, or who are named as the father or possible father.233 Under
225. The Conference began work on the Act in 1989 and finished in 1994. UNIF.
ADOPTION Acr prefatory note at 2, 4 (Proposed Draft 1993). Previous attempts to unify
state laws were unsuccessful. Id. at 1. The original Uniform Adoption Act of 1953 and
its revisions in 1969 and 1971 were only enacted by a few states, and the American Bar
Association worked on but never approved a Model State Adoption Act in the 1980s.
Id. The Conference approved the draft in August 1994.
226. See supra part II.B. In addition, a new act was needed to address the changes in
adoption practices that are not yet reflected in many state laws, such as the differences
between agency placements and direct placements, the newly recognized need for med-
ical and background information, and guidelines on what types of payments are lawful
and unlawful. UNIF. ADOPTION AcT, prefatory note at 1 (Proposed Draft 1993).
227. See supra parts III.A. and III.B.
228. UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 2-401, at 63 (Proposed Draft 1993).
229. Id. § 3-401, at 112; § 3-404, at 116.
230. Id. § 3-704, at 131. In most cases, termination of parental rights is not usually a
problem because the father either does not respond to notice, does not file a claim of
paternity, or is willing to sign a disclaimer. Id. § 3-704 commentary at 138.
231. Specifically, consent is required from any man who: (1) was married to the
mother when the child was born or 300 days before the child's birth; (2) "attempted" to
marry the mother in apparent compliance with the law before the child's birth; (3) ac-
knowledged paternity under the state's law or has been judicially determined to be the
father if the father has also either (a) provided support within his financial means and
regularly visited or communicated with the child or (b) married or attempted to marry
the mother after the child's birth; and (4) has received the minor into his home and
openly held out the minor as his child. Id. § 2-401(a)(1)(i)-(iv), at 63-64.
232. Id. § 2-402(a)(1), (7), at 67-68.
233. UNIF. ADOPTION AcT § 3-401(a)(1), (3), at 112-13 (Proposed Draft 1993).
Others that should be served include, but are not limited to an agency whose consent is
required and another individual who has custody of the child or who has a court-or-
dered right of visitation or communication with the child. Id. § 3-401 (a) (2), (4).
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section 3-404, unknown fathers are entitled to an investigation as to
their identity and whereabouts in order to attempt to give them no-
tice.234 These two sections protect the father's opportunity to know
about the adoption plans. At the same time, these sections protect the
mother's privacy because she is not required to name the father.235 If
the father knows about the child, he has ample time to come forward
and assume parental responsibilities.236 If, however, the father has
been genuinely thwarted, he will be protected by section 3-704 on ter-
mination of parental rights.
Section 3-704, Grounds for Terminating Relationship, divides fa-
thers into two groups based on the grounds for terminating parental
relationships: 1) those fathers who knew or should have known about
the child, and 2) those fathers who were genuinely thwarted. 23 7 The
distinction is helpful because most fathers fall into the first group and
their rights can be terminated if they have not taken specific action to
assume responsibility for the child.238 This includes pre-birth support
from fathers who know or should know about the pregnancy.239 For
the second group of fathers, the few who are genuinely thwarted, the
balance tips in their favor.240 Genuinely thwarted fathers will gain cus-
234. An inquiry must be made and must include: (1) whether the mother was mar-
ried at the probable time of conception or later; (2) whether the mother was cohabitat-
ing with a male at the probable time of conception; (3) whether the mother has
received payments or promises of support for the child or for her pregnancy; (4)
whether the mother has named any father on the birth certificate or in applying for
public assistance; and (5) whether any individual has acknowledged or claimed pater-
nity of the child. Id. § 3-404(b)(1)-(5), at 116-17.
235. The drafters of the Act believe that women often have excellent reasons for not
naming the father and that the mother's right to remain silent outweighs the father's
right to notice. Id. § 3-404 commentary at 118.
236. Id.
237. A father may be genuinely thwarted in several ways: the mother may not tell
him about the child; he may know about the child but not about the mother's plans to
place the child for adoption; he may attempt to provide support for the child but the
mother may refuse to allow him to do so; or he may be unable to provide support
because of poverty, illness, or incarceration. Id. § 2-401 commentary at 66; § 3-704
commentary at 136.
238. UNIF. ADOPTION Acr § 3-704, at 131 (Proposed Draft 1993). The specific ac-
tions that should be taken by the father are: (1) payment of reasonable prenatal, natal,
and postnatal expenses in accordance with his financial means; (2) reasonable and con-
sistent payments for the support of the child within his financial means; (3) regular
visits with the child; and (4) if the child has been in the custody of someone other than
the mother, the father must have manifested ability and willingness to assume legal and
physical custody of the child. Id. § 3-704(a) (1) (i)-(iv), at 131.
239. Id. § 3-704, at 131.
240. If the individual who is the subject of the petition to terminate proves that
he or she had good cause for not complying with the requirements of subsec-
tions (a) (1) or (2) [fathers who know or should know about a child under six
months and fathers of children over six months], and termination is not justi-
fied on a ground stated in subsection (a) (3) through (5) [harmful behavior,
not the biological father, and grounds that may be stated in individual state
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tody of the child as long as 1) they are willing and able to promptly
assume legal and physical custody;241 2) there is no risk of substantial
harm to the child;242 and 3) the change would not be detrimental to
the child.243
The specific requirements placed on the first group of fathers, those
who know or should know about the child, are in accord with the
Supreme Court's requirement that fathers "grasp their opportunity in-
terest."244 Since these fathers know about the child, they have the op-
portunity to choose whether or not to grasp their interest. The pre-
birth requirement is also significant because a father must grasp his
opportunity "promptly" if he knows or should know about the
mother's pregnancy. These requirements successfully balance the fa-
ther's interest with the child's need for a permanent home.
The Act's distinction of the rare but genuinely thwarted father, the
second group of fathers, is also important. In the earlier notice sec-
tion, by requiring an inquiry into an unnamed father's identity, the act
statutes], the court may terminate the individual's parental relationship to a
minor only upon a finding that termination is in the best interest of the minor
and there is clear and convincing evidence that: [the parent has failed to sat-
isfy the requirements of subsections (b) (1)-(4)].
Id. § 3-704(b), at 132.
241. Id. § 3-704(b) (3), at 133. This requirement was based on the New York and
California court rulings requiring "prompt" action and an ability and willingness to
assume custody rather than merely trying to veto the adoption. Id. § 3-704 commentary
at 137.
242. Id. § 3-704(b) (3), at 133. The court may terminate the parental relationship if
it is in the best interest of the minor and if there is clear and convincing evidence that
placing the minor in the individual's legal and physical custody would pose a
risk of substantial harm to the physical or psychological well-being of the mi-
nor [because of the circumstances of the minor's conception, the individual's
behavior during the mother's pregnancy or since the minor's birth, or the
individual's behavior with respect to other minors, indicates that the individ-
ual is unfit to maintain a relationship of parent and child with the minor.]
Id. § 3-704(b) (3), at 133.
243. Id. § 3-704(b) (4), at 133. Parental rights may be terminated if failure to termi-
nate would be detrimental to the minor.
In determining detriment, the court shall consider any relevant factor,
including the individual's efforts to obtain or maintain legal and physical cus-
tody of the minor, the individual's ability to pay for the minor's support, the
age and custodial environment of the minor before being placed for adop-
tion, the quality of any previous relationship between the individual and the
minor and between the individual and any other minor children, the duration
and suitability of the minor's present custodial environment, the effect of a
change of physical custody on the minor, and any recommendation of the
minor's guardian ad litem.
UNIF. ADOPTION Acr § 3-704(b) (4), at 132-33 (Proposed Draft 1993). This fourth sec-
tion is an attempt to balance the needs of a child who has already been living with
prospective adoptive parents for some time with the interests of a father who has genu-
inely been thwarted of his opportunity to establish a relationship with his child. Id. § 3-
704 commentary at 138-39.
244. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262, (1983).
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recognizes the need to protect his opportunity interest even if the
mother does not want to identify him.245 In the Grounds for Termina-
tion section, by granting custody to the genuinely thwarted father who
does appear, the Act encourages the other parties to notify the father
as soon as possible, rather than merely hoping he does not appear
later.
The Act also attempts to balance the father's interests with the
child's needs for a stable and permanent environment by requiring
that the genuinely thwarted father be able and willing to assume cus-
tody, as in New York and California, and by considering the detrimen-
tal effects that a change of custody might have on the child.
Finally, the father's rights are limited by the safety needs of the
mother and the child in two provisions. 24 6 First, both knowing fathers
and thwarted fathers will lose their parental rights if they have been
convicted of a violent crime or if they have violated a restraining or
protective order.2 47 Second, the thwarted father will lose parental
rights if there is a risk of substantial harm to the child because of situa-
tions such as rape or incest or other harm to the mother or to any
other child.248
VII. MINNESOTA'S 1994 LEGISLATION
In 1994, the Legislature amended the adoption laws in Minne-
sota. 249 The new laws affect many areas of the adoption process, such
as adoption studies, birth parent histories, consents, payments, adver-
tising, and significant regulations for both agencies and direct adop-
tive placements.250 A new statute specifically on Direct Adoptive
Placements was added251 with two subdivisions directly affecting puta-
tive fathers.252
A. Notice for Fathers: Protecting Mothers and Children from Risk of Harm
Subdivision three of the 1994 statute requires a custody order from a
district court before a child is placed with adoptive parents. 253 At this
245. UNIF. ADOPTION Acr § 3-404 (Proposed Draft 1993). See supra notes 233-36 and
accompanying text.
246. UNIF. ADOPTION Acr § 3-704 commentary at 136 (Proposed Draft 1993).
247. Id. § 3-704(a) (3) commentary at 132.
248. Id. § 3-704(b) (3) commentary at 133.
249. Act of Aug. 1, 1994, ch. 631, 1994 MINN. LAws 1873. This Act resulted from a
merger of two bills-one from the Attorney General and the other from the Minnesota
Department of Human Services Task Force.
250. For example, consent may not be made until 72 hours after birth and must be
within 60 days after placement. Id. § 15, subd. 2a, 1994 MINN. LAws 1879. This provi-
sion amends MINN. STAT. § 259.24.
251. Act of Aug. 1, 1994, ch. 631, § 22, 1994 MINN. LAws 1882.
252. Id., subds. 3, 8.
253. Id., subd. 3(a).
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point in the process, both parents must sign affidavits indicating their
support of the motion.254 If there is no affidavit from the birth father,
the birth mother must sign an affidavit that "describes her good faith
efforts or efforts made on her behalf to identify and locate the birth
father for purposes of securing his consent."255
Exceptions are allowed if there is a risk of harm to the mother or
child. A mother may instead submit an affidavit stating that she is ex-
empt from making efforts to identify and locate the father if,
(1) the child was conceived as the result of incest or rape;
(2) efforts to locate ... could result in physical harm to the mother
or child; or
(3) efforts to locate . . . could reasonably result in severe emotional
distress of the birth mother or child.
256
The notice language does not require the mother to identify and
locate the father, but only to state the efforts that she made.2 57 The
intent of the language is to encourage the mother to notify the father
so that more fathers can be involved in the adoption process. 258 The
father's involvement not only lets the mother know early on if the fa-
ther will object to the adoption, but also helps in the collection of birth
parent history.259
No new categories of father's rights are created.260 If the father is
not already entitled to notice under the existing notice statutes,
26 1
then he is governed by the Retention of Rights statute26 2 which re-
quires him to find out about the child on his own and file an affidavit
of his intent to retain parental rights.
263
In summary, genuinely thwarted fathers in Minnesota still do not
have statutory rights to notice. With the new statute, it is hoped that
more mothers will be encouraged to give them notice. However, if it
does not work out this way, Minnesota should seriously consider re-
quiring notice to the genuinely thwarted father under a provision simi-
lar to that of the Uniform Adoption Act.
254. Id., subd. 3(a)(2).
255. Id., subd. 3(b). (emphasis added).
256. Act of Aug. 1, 1994, ch. 631, § 22, subd. 3(b)(1)-(3), 1994 MINN. LAws 1882.
257. The language is actually ambiguous and open to interpretation by the courts.
Telephone interview with LauraSue Schlatter, Assistant Attorney General, Office of the
Attorney General (June 10, 1994).
258. Id.
259. Id.
260. Id.
261. MINN. STAT. §§ 257.74, 259.26 (1992 & Supp. 1993). See supra notes 156-58 and
accompanying text for a discussion of the statutes.
262. MINN. STAT. § 259.261 (1992). This statute is often referred to as the "60/90
Day Statute."
263. Id. See supra notes 159-65 and accompanying text.
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The new statute also successfully balances the father's interests with
the safety needs of the mother and child. The putative father need not
receive notice in cases of incest and rape, physical harm, or severe
emotional distress.
B. Limitation on Time to Act
Subdivision eight to the 1994 statute limits the father's rights to con-
sent to or veto the adoption. If the father's consent is required, then
he must consent to or veto the adoption within sixty days of personal
service, otherwise he is deemed to have consented to the adoption.2 64
The time limitation has a foundation in the United States Supreme
Court decisions, the New York and California decisions, the Indiana
statute, and the Uniform Adoption Act. The Quilloin Court ruled that
eleven years was too long to wait to seek visitation,265 and the Lehr
court ruled that two years was too long to wait to file an action with the
court.26 6 New York and California both require the putative father to
act "promptly" once he knows about the adoption,26 7 and New York
has further ruled that promptness is measured in terms of the child's
birth, not in terms of the father's awareness of the child.268 The Indi-
ana statute requires the father to act within thirty days of receiving
notice,269 and the Uniform Adoption Act does not require consent
from a father who does not respond within thirty days of notice. 270 In
summary, the sixty day time limitation on the father is consistent with
these other cases and statutes. In addition, the time limit is necessary
to balance the father's rights with the needs of the child for early per-
manence and stability.
C. Limitation Requiring Custody and Paternity
The Minnesota statute still does not require the birth father to be
willing and able to assume custody of the child or to establish paternity
264. Act of Aug. 1, 1994, ch. 631, § 22, subd. 8(b), 1994 MINN. LAws 1886. The 60
day limit works together with the Retention of Rights statute, MINN. STAT. § 259.261,
and the Preadoption Residence statute, MINN STAT. § 259.27, subd. 4. The Retention of
Rights statute gives the father 60 days from placement or 90 days from birth, whichever
is sooner, to file with the state. The Preadoption Residency statute requires the child to
reside in the adoptive home for three months before the adoption can be finalized. See
supra note 85.
265. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 254-55 (1978).
266. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). See supra notes 69-79 and accom-
panying text.
267. See supra notes 126, 146 and accompanying text.
268. Robert 0. v. Russell K., 604 N.E.2d 99, 103-04 (N.Y. 1992). See supra note 137
and accompanying text.
269. IND. CODE § 31-3-1-6.1(m). See supra note 219 and accompanying text.
270. UNIF. ADoPrION Acr § 2-402(a) (7) at 68 (Proposed Draft 1993). See supra note
232 and accompanying text.
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of the child. As a result, the father can veto the adoption without as-
suming any responsibility for the child, and the mother who wanted to
place the child for adoption may end up raising the child herself. The
interests of the father must be balanced with the rights and needs of
the mother and child. Minnesota should further amend the current
statutes to require the father to both 1) be willing and able to assume
custody of the child and 2) establish paternity, in order to veto an
adoption.
A willingness to assume custody of the child is an essential require-
ment because it ensures that the father is genuinely interested in
parenting the child, not merely trying to harass the mother or veto the
adoption without any intentions of parenting the child.
The custody requirement has a foundation in the decisions of the
Supreme Court and in the various state laws. The Supreme Court rec-
ognized the custody requirement in Quilloin when it denied Quilloin's
petition because he only requested visitation rights, not custody of the
child.271 New York and California both require that the father be will-
ing and able to assume custody of the child, not merely trying to veto
the adoption. 2 72 Indiana gives the father an option to either contest
the adoption or to establish paternity.2 73 Finally, in the cases of a gen-
uinely thwarted father, the Uniform Adoption Act would require the
father to be willing and able to promptly assume legal and physical
custody in order to veto the adoption.2 74
Requiring the father to establish paternity is beneficial to both the
child and the father. This requirement protects the child by ensuring
that there is a legal father who will be responsible for the child's sup-
port in the future. This requirement also protects the father because
he is creating a legal relationship with his child and his constitutional
rights to that relationship will then be protected.275
VIII. CONCLUSION
Under the United States Constitution, the putative father's rights are
protected when he assumes the duties of parenthood. In an infant
adoption, however, the father's rights must also be balanced with the
rights and needs of the mother, the child, and the state. Several states
271. Quilloin v. Walcott, 434 U.S. 246, 256 (1978). Seesupra notes 43-44 and accom-
panying text.
272. In re Kelsey S., 823 P.2d 1216, 1236-37 (Cal. 1992); In re Raquel Marie X. II, 559
N.E.2d 418, 424, 428 (N.Y. 1990). See supra notes 128, 147 and accompanying text.
273. IND. CODE § 31-3-1-6.1(m). See supra note 218 and accompanying text.
274. The genuinely thwarted father is the rare father who genuinely did not know
about the child or was unable to support the child. The custody requirement is in UNIF.
ADOPTION Acr § 3-704(b)(1) at 133. See supra notes 237, 241 and accompanying text.
275. See supra notes 76-79 and accompanying text (discussing the current constitu-
tional standard protecting a father who has "grasped" his opportunity interest).
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have attempted to strike the proper balance between these rights, and
there are four elements to an adoption law that achieves a good bal-
ance. First, the father should be notified of the proceedings in the
beginning of the adoption process so that he has an opportunity to
take on his paternal duties if he is genuinely interested in doing so.
Second, fathers should be required to act promptly, with a time limit
on their right to veto the adoption, in order to protect the child's need
for early stability. Third, the father should be required to be willing
and able to assume custody of the child in order to ensure that he is
genuinely interested in parenting the child. Fourth, the state may
choose to not provide notice to fathers if there is a risk of harm to the
mother or child.
Tonya M. Zdon
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